Kriste A. Pitkin v. Preston\u27s Incorporated, Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Kriste A. Pitkin v. Preston's Incorporated, Industrial
Commission of Utah : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George W. Preston; attorney for respondents.
Gordon J. Low; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Kriste A. Pitkin v. Preston's Incorporated, Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 914588.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3866
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KfU 
45.9 
.%9 
DOpKET WO. 
UTAH S U M * * * * > U * F 
BWEF 
teJZJV/f-
KRISTR ^. PITKIN, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
E M E C O U R T 
E O F U T A H 
LAW LIBRAE \ 
1 " iUMl37J 
> < 3 . Case n o . 1458B 
PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Gordon J. Low 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
George W. Preston 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondents 
J UN 111 19/6 
Clork. S^ ic^o Cota*. l u ^ 
""ABLE OF C/T^ TTIT^  
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
ISSUE NO. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
ISSUE NO. 3 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ACTED ARBITRARILY IN NOT 
CONSIDERING OR ACTING UPON 
THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES 
WHEN SUCH TESTIMONY IS SUB-
STANTIAL, CREDIBLE, AND 
UNCONTRADICTED 4 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
PROMPTLY REPORT HER INJURY 
DOES NOT BAR COMPENSATION..9 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE 
APPLICANT DID SUSTAIN AN 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY BY ACCI-
DENT IN THE COURSE OF HER 
EMPLOYMENT, DESPITE HER 
INABILITY TO RECALL THE 
PRECISE TIME AND OCCURRENCE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR SAID INJURY.10 
CONCLUSION 16 
l 
CASKS CITED 
Page 
ft*v&r v# rr»^ n«:*r i^il ' orml «j«*1 on, 17 r*tah 2d 141, 405 D.2d 
-~ ^ '.!"! ''JW, 4#9,13,x4,l€ 
Bamberger Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 
240 P. 1103. 13 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 
P. 1030 4 
Employer1s Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. 
Industrial Commission, 34 Arizona App. 427, 539 P.2d 
541 (1575) 9 
Fenton v. Thornely, 1903 A.C. 443 (1903) 13,12 
Frederickson v. Industrial Commission 68 Utah 206, 249 
P7~480 13 
Lorange v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 261, 153 P.2d 
*" 272 8 
Pintar v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 14 Utah 2d 276, 
282 P. 2d 414 10,14,15 
Purity Bisguit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 20, P. 2d 
9 Si (Utah, 1945) . .11,12,15,16 
Residential and Commercial Construction Company and State 
Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utan and Gary 
Lynn Eskels3H7 529 j?.2d 457 (Utah, 1975) 15 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
44 ALR 363 12 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed.) $37.20, 1976# 12,13 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed.) §38.20, 1976. . 13 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed.) §39.10, 1976. . 15 
U.C.A. Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35 15 
U.C.A. 35-1-44 10 
U.C.A. 35-1-46 17 
U.C.A. 35-1-99 10 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTE A. PITKIN, * 
Plaintiff and * 
Appellant, 
vs. Case no. 14588 
PRESTON'S INCORPORATED and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * 
UTAH, 
* 
Defendants and 
Respondents, * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant is appealing from an Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying comepnsation to Appellant under 
Workmen's Compensation provisions of the Utah Code Annotated 
[hereinafter cited as U.C.A.]. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of the 
Industrial Commission and a determination of the disability, 
suffered by Appellant, under provisions of U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time the injury was sustained, Appellant was 
a 2 3-year-old female employed by Defendant, Preston's Incorporated 
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owners of a bus station in Logan, Utah. Her period of employment 
was from the 17th day of December, 1973, until the 9th day 
of December, 1974, at which time she was terminated. Her duties 
included selling tickets for Greyhound bus lines, occasionally 
cashiering at the cafe, and handling freight, some of which 
weighed one hundred pounds (T.R. 9). More specifically, her 
handling of freight included lifting outgoing freight or baggage 
onto carts, removing incoming freight from the carts, and retrievi 
freight for customers. 
While lifting freight on or about the 2 8th day of 
August, 1974, Appellant suffered an acute attack of back 
pain which radiated down her left leg. Appellant did not 
recognize that the leg pain was associated with her back 
injury until the 5th day of September when she was told by 
Dr. Russell N. Hirst that she was probably suffering from 
an "early disc". Later, at an employees' party, Appellant 
informed Respondent corporation's president, Patrick Preston 
that she had a ruptured disc (T.R.42). 
Dr. Hirst referred Appellant to Dr. James M. Steele 
who diagnosed her injury as a herniated nucleus pulposis L5 
SI on the left or a herniated disc. (See Exhibit A-l). 
In November, a claim was filed with the Industrial 
Commission placing the date of injury on September, 19, 1974, 
"over a period of time working caused by lifting freight". 
Subsequent to the filing, Appellant contacted counsel who 
instructed her to try to remember the exact date and time of 
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the accident (T.R. 45, 46). As a result she determined that it 
occurred on or about the 28th day of August, 1974. An amended 
complaint was filed alleging the 2 8th day of August. Appellant 
continued working until she was terminated on December 9, 1974. 
A hearing was held in the Hearing Room of the 
Industrial Commission of Jtah on March 19, 1975 pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Industrial Commission. The two 
witnesses who testified at the hearing in addition to Appellant 
were Patrick Preston and Heather Hardy. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily in 
not considering or acting upon the testimony of 
witnesses when such testimony is substantial, 
credible, and uncontradicted. 
2. Appellant's failure to promptly report her 
injury does not bar compensation. 
3. The Industrial Commission erred in not finding 
that, as a matter of law, the Applicant did sustain 
an industrial injury by accident in the course of 
her employment, despite her inability to recall 
the precise time and occurrence responsible for 
said injury. 
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ARGUEMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY IN 
NOT CONSIDERING OR ACTING UPON THE TESTIMONY OF 
WITNESSES WHEN SUCH TESTIMONY IS SUBSTANTIAL, 
CREDIBLE, AND UNCONTRADICTED. 
It is evident from the Industrial Commission's 
findings that Appellant's claim of disability resulting from 
a back injury is undisputed. The primary question is whether 
the injury was sustained by accident in the course of 
Appellant's employment. Consistent with legislative intent, 
this Court has liberally construed provisions for employees' 
right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation (see 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020). 
"This court is committed to the rule that as a matter of law 
the Commission may not, without any reason or cause, arbitrarily 
or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon substantial, 
competent and credible evidence which is uncontradicted.11 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, 
614-15 (1965) and cases cited therein. 
In the instant case Appellant testified that the 
accident occurred on or about the 28th day of August, at which 
time she suffered low back and sciatic pain. She did not 
realize that this sciatic pain was associated with her back 
injury until the 5th day of September when she was examined 
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by Dr. Hirst. She then informed at least two people of her 
injury at an employees1 party. One was Heather Hardy, a 
fellow employee and the other was Patrick H. Preston, President 
of Preston's Inc. 
No formal report of the injury was made to Respondent 
corporation due to its failure to produce any Industrial Insurance 
and its lack of assistance to employees relative to claims 
and notice of injury forms. (T.R. 42, 43) Notwithstanding 
the above, Respondent did not even commence an investigation, 
despite the fact that Preston was informed of the accidental 
injury only eight days after the approximate date of injury. 
Further, Appellant did inquire about Workmen's Compensation 
benefits on the 19th day of September subsequent to being 
examined by Dr. Steele (T.R. 31,36). 
In the instant case, acknowledgement of corroborative 
evidence given by the two witnesses who testified at the hearing 
on March 19th is conspicuously absent from the Findings. Both 
Preston and Hardy testified and substantiated Appellant1s 
testimony concerning the issues of the time Appellant incurred 
her injury, the apparent nature of the injury, and when Respondent 
corporation was informed of the accidental injury. 
Heather Hardy, who was still employed by Preston's 
Inc. at the time of the hearing, testified that in August she 
personally observed Appellant limp after the last week in August. 
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MR. PRESTON Q Do you recall anything that she 
specifically said to you during that month? 
A No 
Q Concerning her back I mean? 
A Not until after she had talked to Dr. Hirst. 
0 I see. So that was the first time that you heard 
anything concerning her back, was when she talked to 
Dr. Hirst? 
A Well, we had discussed leg pain, but we didn't 
know it was her back. 
Q When did she first discuss the fact that she had 
leg pain? 
A She didn't have to. I brought it up. She was 
limping. 
Q What date was that? 
A Sometime during the last week in August. I don't 
know what day. 
Q How do you know it was the last week of August? 
A Because it was about a week after I had returned 
from a trip home to California the first of August. 
Q Did she complain of leg pain? 
A Uh-huh. She was limping and she'd sit down, and 
she couldn't stand straight up after sitting for a 
while (T.R. 66 1 1-23). 
Q But as near as you can pinpoint, did you first 
start noticing the pain that she was apparently 
sutfering in her leg? 
A It was the last week of August. 
MR. PRESTON: That's all (T.R. 93 1 18-22). 
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This testimony clearly substantiated Appellant's 
statements concerning the time of her injury. It also focuses 
on the differences between normal backaches of which nearly 
all employees complained and the very serious nature of the 
herniated disc Appellant suffered. It is clear that such 
testimony should have been considered both in relation to the 
time and occurrance of the accident and to the issue of Appellant's 
credibility. 
Heather Hardy further verified both that she had 
been told of the injury on September 5th and that Earl Halverson 
was informed on September 19th. 
MR. PRESTON: Q When did she first tell you that 
she hurt it working? 
A She never really did. 
Q So this is the first time you have ever heard 
that this injury occurred as a result of employment 
at Dick's Cafe then? 
A No. Because after she had gone to the doctor, and 
they had decided that it was her back, and it could 
be from lifting the freight. She hadn't been doing 
any other strenuous activity, or lifting anything so 
(T.R. 67 1 9-17). 
Q Do you know whether or not she filed — of your 
knowledgef or any other employee, including Earl 
Halverson —of any notice of any injury that she 
sustained? 
A Not until after she had gone to the doctor on 
the 19th. 
Q So that was the first time you were aware that 
she claimed an injury? 
A No. At the employees' party she did bring it up 
that she had talked to Dr. Hirst, and he had told 
her that he thought it might be a crushed disc. 
(T.R. 70 1 10-19). 
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Patrick Preston also stated that he had been informed 
of Appellant's injury on September 5thf the day of the employees' 
party. 
MR. PRESTON: O And can you tie any one of these 
conversations? The first date that you can place on 
a conversation? Can you tell us the approximate 
date? 
A I can't tell you the approximate date. I think 
it was at the employees' party, however. 
Q When was that, approximately? 
A I don't remember. I'm sure it's in the records. 
Q Would you tell me what was said at that time? 
A I think she said she had a bad back ache at the time. 
Now she announced to me that she was going to have an 
operation. I don't remember whether it was then. I 
don't think so. I think it was sometime in November. 
But there again, I'm sorry, but I can't remember a 
date. 
O Did she tell you the reason for the bad back? 
A No, she didn't tell me any reason for the bad 
back. Oh yes. She told me a reason of lifting 
freight. I'm not sure that I accept that reason. 
MR. LOW: I move to have that stricken, Your Honor. 
What difference does it make whether she accepted that 
or not? 
REFEREE: Well, for that reason it may stand. 
(T.R. 84 1. 17-25, 85 1 1-11) 
The Commission should have considered these witnesses' 
testimony because it is not bound by the testimony of the 
claimant to the exclusion of all other evidence in reaching 
its final determination. Lorange v. Industrial Commission, 
107 Utah 261, 153 P.2d 272. Had the Commission considered 
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this evidencef the only reasonable conclusion it could have 
reached would be that a serious back injury had been sustained 
by Appellant during the last week of August on or about the 
2 8th day in the course of her employment. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROMPTLY REPORT 
HER INJURY DOES NOT BAR COMPENSATION. 
Appellant's failure to promptly report her injury 
is "not sufficiently consistant with the facts to be ground for 
denying compensation where the injury was of the kind that would 
ordinarily cause the claimant to think that it would soon heal 
and that it would be alright to continue working" Baker, supra, 
at 614. Similarly, in Arizona, the Court of Appeals does 
not charge the claimant with the duty of knowing the nature 
of his injury before it is determined by a competent medical 
investigation. Employer's Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. 
Industrial Commission, 24 Arizona App. 427, 539 P.2d 541 (1975). 
In the instant case, Appellant continued working, testifying 
that she did not recognize the pain in her leg as symptomatic 
of a back injury until September 5th (T.R. 15, 42, 67, 70). 
When she became aware of the seriousness of her injury she 
did notify Patrick Preston the same day. 
Respondent appears to blame Appellant for failing to 
report the accident the day it occurred, despite the fact that 
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she did not realize the nature of the accidental injury as 
shown above. Respondent then ignored the fact that no notice 
relative to Workmenfs Compensation, no claim forms, no reporting 
procedures, nor any evidence of insurance was provided by Respondent 
The combination of these things and Appellant's inability to 
diagnose her injury are what caused the delay in reporting. 
The Code provides, under Section 35-1-99, one year 
for notice to be given a reduction for late notice after 4 8 
hours if the employer investigates the accident. Respondent 
took no action. ^here is nothing unusual in this case to bar 
compensation. 
ISSUE NO. 3 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, 
AS A MATTER.OF LAW, THE APPLICANT DID SUSTAIN AN 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY BY ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HER 
EMPLOYMENT, DESPITE HER INABILITY TO RECALL THE PRECISE 
TIME AND OCCURRANCE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAID INJURY. 
The major issue arising out of the March 19th hearing 
was whether Applicant sustained an "injury by accident" which 
can be compensated as provided in U.C.A. 35-1-44. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that Appellant suffered a back 
injury, but that the injury developed over a period of time 
and, therefore, falls without the statutory definition of 
"injury by accident." On authority of Pintar v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 14 Utah 2d 276, 282 P.2d 414, the Judge 
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held that a claimant must be able to specify an "identifiable 
accident or accidents in the course of the employment." In 
holding that a precise act or incident be alleged in order to 
receive compensation, the Administrative Law Judge has mis-
construed the intent of the Legislature. 
This issue focuses on the definition of "injury by accider 
A brief review of the history and purpose of Workmen's Compensation 
legislation is enlightening. The English Workmen's Compensation 
Law provided compensation for "injury by accident." The 1903 
case of Fenton v. Thornley, 1903 A.C. 443, held that an employee 
who ruptured himself by strain in the course of his work was 
within the provisions of the statute andf significantly, that 
the rupture was unexplained despite intended strain. The discussio: 
of this case and subsequent interpretation in Purity Bisquit 
Co. v. Industrial Commissiony 201 P. 2d 961, 967 (Utah, 1949) 
is definitive of the proper legislative construction of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The opinion recognized that the language of the 
statute suggests a separate accidental event which 
causes the injury but held that such language 
was used loosely and should be construed in its 
popular sense. That so construed, all that is 
required is that the resulting injury be accidental. 
It was said that the distinction between accidental 
cause and accidental result was over the heads of 
parliament and of employer and employee, and that 
the average person would consider he had met with 
an accident in either case. 
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Under this construction, the "accident" in the instant 
case was the rupture of the disc and the result in "injury" 
was the pain and restricted ability to sitf stand, and lift. 
The opinion further addressed the problem of legislative 
intent at page 968 of the text. 
This very problem was discussed and legislatures were 
advised that if the result reached in Fenton v. Thornley, 
supra, was intended, the use of the term "injury by 
accident", since its meaning had been construed to 
mean only an unexpected result, was desirable. There-
after, with full access to that decision and article 
our legislature enacted our Workmen1s Compensation 
Law and adopted the term "injury by accident." 
It is a familiar doctrine of statutory construction 
that where a legislature adopts a statute which 
has already been construed, it usually adopts the 
construction placed thereon. 
The opinion recognizes that if the policy behind 
Workmen's Compensation is to "insure all employees against 
disabling accidental injury caused by employment" and "to 
prevent expensive litigation and uncertain results" then to hold 
that an internal failure, such as a herniated disc, comes within 
the statutory requirements in consistent with such intent. Id. at 
Thus, the term "injury by accident" embodies, primarily 
the element of unexpectedness. See 44 ALR 36 3, Larson, Workmenf s 
Compensation (Desk Ed.) §37.20, 1976. In the instant case, 
this element is satisfied on the authority of Fenton v. Thornley 
-12-
which defines an accident as "an unlooked for mishap or an 
untoward event which is not expected or designed." First, 
the existence of Appellant's injury is acknowledged in the 
findings of the Administrative Law Judge. Additionally, 
the unexpected nature of the injury is confirmed by Appellant, 
herself, in response to the Referee's questioning at the hearing 
(T.R. 50 1 17-25, 51 1. 1-16). It is clear that Appellant's 
injury was unexpected. 
A second element of the term "injury by accident" is 
one which has been added by most jurisdictions: The 
injury should be reasonably identifiable as to time and 
occurrence. Larson § 37.20. The Utah cases of Frederickson 
v. Industrial Commission, 68 Utah 206, 249 P. 480 and Bamberger 
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103 
hold that an internal failure was not accidental when no 
definite time or place of injury was determined. However, 
a case factually similar to the case at bar appears to have 
modified this strict interpretation, thus bringing the treat-
ment of like cases in line with the heavy preponderance of jur-
isdictions which allow compensation for herniated disc 
injuries without demanding proof of a particular occasion as 
the cause. See Larson, §38.20. The case is Baker v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. 
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In Baker, the claimant was denied compensation by the 
Commission for a ruptured disc on the ground that her injury 
did not occur in nor did it arise out of her employment as 
a clerk-typist. The order was reversed on appeal, the 
state's highest court holding that "[t]he claimant's indefinite 
statements concerning the cause of the injury should not be 
held to defeat her recovery." (emphasis added) Ijd. , at 614. As 
in the case at bar, Claimant's testimony was indefinite as to 
the cause of the injury. Also, the injury, the nature of which 
was uncertain until days afterward, was not reported to the 
employer until the following week. Her testimony was also 
supported by credible testimony which was either disbelieved 
or not considered by the Commission. 
The Pintar case, supra, upon which the Commission's 
Findings were predicated in the instant case, is inapposite 
especially in light of Baker, supra. In Pintar, supra, the 
claimant was suffering from a degenerative arthritic lumbar 
spine, and one of the issues appears to have been whether the 
injury was an occupational disease and compensable. In the 
present case, Appellant sustained an injury of internal 
failure of a disc, there being no question of whether it was 
compensable as an occupational disease. The criteria to be 
established for an "identifiable accident or accidents" 
(Pintar, supra, at 415) in occupational diseases are necessarily 
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different from those to establish an "injury by accident." 
(compare chapters 1 and 2 of Title 35, U.C.A.) There is, 
therefore, no basis for Pintar as authority under the facts 
of this case. 
Conceding the fact that herniated discs do sometimes 
develop over a period of time, that period of time can be as 
short as a couple of hours. Larson, §39.10 and cases cited 
therein. This fact probably constitutes the reason Appellant 
is unable to recall an exact moment or triggering occurrence 
of her injury, although she can approximate the week and even 
the day she experienced pain. This inability is not essential, 
however. "The accident consists in the unexpected internal 
failure of his system to function normally, ^here is no req lirement 
that the accident be the first in the chain of events which ulti-
mately results in injury or that it be an outward force applied 
to the employee, all it requires is injury or death by accident." 
Purity, supra, at 966. Most recently, in the case of Residential 
and. Commercial Construction Co. and State Insurance Fund v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Gary Lynn Kskelson, 529 P.2d 
457 (Utah, 1975), the court held that a lumbosacral strain was 
unexpected and compensable despite the fact that the medical 
panel found the injury resulted from congenital anomaly instead 
of trauma. 
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In th<* instant case, the accident was the rupturing 
of the disc which caused symptoms of pain. The pain, resulting 
in inability to move and a disability in employment constitutes 
the injury. Thus the requisites of injury by accident are 
satisfied under both Purity, supra, and Baker, supra. Finally, 
since the Administrative Law Judge stated that it was the lifting 
of freight which contributed significantly to Appellant's injury, 
it is clear that, as a matter of law, she sustained an injury 
by accident in the course of her employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is 
to provide compensatory relief for injuries sustained in the 
course of employment. There is nothing to indicate that the 
intent of the Legislature is to compensate only those employees 
who can demonstrate an exact time and precise act which caused 
their injuries. Such an interpretation would both arbitratily 
deny legitimate claims and facter fabrication of events to 
fulfill such requisites. 
First, it appears that the Commission, as a fact 
finding body, disregarded testimony of a substantial, credible 
and competent nature. There was even testimony from the 
president of Respondent corporation to corraborate, not to 
discredit, Appellant's testimony. There is no good cause 
why the Commission arbitrarily failed to mention uncontradicted 
evidence or record. 
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Secondly, Appellant's failure to promptly report 
her injury is not a bar to her recovery. There is nothing 
to indicate she had any reason to make specific note of it 
until she discussed the matter with counsel. Certainly her 
employer did not aid in her knowledge regarding notice require-
ments for Workmen's Compensation. The fact is that Respondent 
was not in compliance with U.C.A.35-1-46 requiring some kind 
of employee insurance. 
Ultimately the facts show that Appellant sustained 
an injury by accident on or about the 28th day of August, 1974, 
while she was lifting freight. She is unable to recall the 
exact moment or act which initiated the accidental injury. 
However, her candid admission of her inability does not preclude 
recovery because the statutory requirements of "injury by 
accident" are fulfilled by the accidental event of her ruptured 
disc and the resulting injury of nerve impingement causing 
pain. Appellant is therefore, entitled to compensation. For 
this reason and those stated above, the Order of the Industrial 
Commission should be reversed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Gordon J. Low 
Attorney for Appellant 
175 East First North 
Logan , UT 
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I hereby certify that I delivered copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellant to the Industrial Commission 
of Utahr and to George W. Preston, Attorney for Defendantf 
this day of June, 1976. 
